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Abstract
Adversarial learning has emerged as one of the successful techniques to circumvent
the susceptibility of existing methods against adversarial perturbations. However,
the majority of existing defense methods are tailored to defend against a single
category of adversarial perturbation (e.g. `∞-attack). In safety-critical applications,
this makes these methods extraneous as the attacker can adopt diverse adversaries
to deceive the system. To tackle this challenge of robustness against multiple
perturbations, we propose a novel meta-learning framework that explicitly learns to
generate noise to improve the model’s robustness against multiple types of attacks.
Specifically, we propose Meta Noise Generator (MNG) that outputs optimal noise
to stochastically perturb a given sample, such that it helps lower the error on
diverse adversarial perturbations. However, training on multiple perturbations
simultaneously significantly increases the computational overhead during training.
To address this issue, we train our MNG while randomly sampling an attack at
each epoch, which incurs negligible overhead over standard adversarial training.
We validate the robustness of our framework on various datasets and against a wide
variety of unseen perturbations, demonstrating that it significantly outperforms the
relevant baselines across multiple perturbations with marginal computational cost
compared to the multiple perturbations training.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have demonstrated enormous success on multiple benchmark applications [1,
2, 3], by achieving super-human performance on certain tasks. However, to deploy them to safety-
critical applications [4, 5, 6, 7], we need to ensure that the model is robust as well as accurate,
since incorrect predictions may lead to severe consequences. Particularly, it is well-known that the
existing neural networks are highly susceptible to carefully crafted image perturbations which are
imperceptible to humans but derail the predictions of these otherwise accurate networks.
The emergence of adversarial examples has received significant attention in the research community
and several defense mechanisms have been proposed [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. However, despite such a
large literature to improve upon the adversarial robustness of neural networks, most of the existing
defenses leverage the knowledge of the adversaries and are based on the assumption of only a
single perturbation. Consequently, many of the proposed defenses were circumvented by stronger
attacks [5, 14, 15, 16]. Several recent works have claimed the problem of over-fitting of the existing
defenses based on this assumption of the adversary [17, 12] and have demonstrated the vulnerability
of existing defense methods against multiple adversarial perturbations. Yet there are only a handful
of techniques that improve robustness across multiple perturbations.
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The multiple perturbations training [12] comes at an additional cost; it increases the training cost by a
factor of four over adversarial training, which is already ten times more costly than standard training.
This slowdown factor hinders the research progress of robustness against multiple perturbations due
to the large computation overhead incurred during training. Some recent works reduce this cost
by reducing the complexity of generating adversarial examples [18, 19], however, they are limited
to `∞ adversarial training. To tackle the issue, we advocate an effective Stochastic Adversarial
Training (SAT) algorithm that samples a perturbation from the distribution of perturbations to produce
robust classifiers against multiple perturbations with negligible additional training cost over the
standard adversarial training. Furthermore, we complement all the methods with efficient training
techniques [20, 19] to accelerate training for multiple perturbations by a factor of eight on a single
machine with one GeForce RTX 2080Ti using PreAct ResNet18 architecture [21]. To this end,
utilizing our SAT, we further reduce up to 50% training time compared to the baseline strategies.
To tackle the critical challenge of robustness to multiple perturbations, we investigate the relationship
between generalization to diverse perturbations and noise injection. In particular, we resort to meta-
learning [22, 23], and propose a Meta Noise Generator (MNG) that learns to stochastically perturb a
given sample in a meta-learning framework to improve the generalization across perturbations. Our
algorithm is motivated by the popular phenomenon of noise regularization being a common technique
to improve the generalization performance of deep neural networks [24, 25, 26, 27]. Additionally, we
introduce a novel augmentation loss to improve the performance utilizing our generated samples,
adversarial samples, and clean samples to push the decision boundary and enforce a smooth and
robust network across multiple perturbations. To this end, we combine our proposed meta-noise
generator with SAT to achieve state-of-the-art networks robust against multiple perturbations with a
significant reduction in training time compared to the multiple perturbations training techniques.
We validate the efficacy and efficiency of our proposed method by comparing it against existing, state-
of-the-art methods on CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset. Further, we dissect the individual components of
our proposed method and also visualize the loss landscape against diverse attacks. The experimental
results show that our method obtains significantly superior performance over the existing baseline
methods trained with multiple perturbations, generalizes to diverse perturbations, and significantly
reduces the computational cost incurred by training with multiple perturbations. In summary, the
major contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We tackle the critical problems of robustness to multiple perturbations and computational
overhead incurred by training with multiple adversarial perturbations. To this end, we
propose stochastic adversarial training that samples from a distribution of perturbations
and achieves significant improvement over standard adversarial training with a negligible
increase in computation cost.
• We formulate a novel meta-training framework that explicitly meta-learns an input-dependent
noise generator, such that it outputs stochastic noise distribution to improve the model’s
robustness against multiple types of adversarial perturbations.
• We validate our multiple perturbations adversarial learning framework on various datasets
with diverse gradient-based and decision-based attacks, on which it achieves state-of-the-art
performance, highlighting its practical impact in real-world systems.
2 Related Work
Robustness against single adversarial perturbation. In the past few years, multiple defenses have
been proposed to defend against a single adversarial perturbation [11, 28, 29, 30, 13, 10] and have
been consequently circumvented by subsequent attacks [14, 17, 31, 32]. Adversarial-training based
defenses [13, 11, 30] have been the only exceptions that have withstood the intense scrutiny and
have provided empirical gains in adversarial robustness. There have also been various attempts to
increase robustness using models that leverage the representative power of generative models to
project onto the manifold of standard input images [33, 34]. Consequently. these models have shown
to be ineffective by stronger attacks [5, 14]. Recently, the meta-learning framework has emerged
as a novel technique to construct adversarial examples [35, 36]. However, our proposed method is
fundamentally orthogonal to all these methods; in contrast to learning the generative model to model
the adversarial examples, we leverage the generator to explicitly learn an input-dependent optimal
noise distribution to lower adversarial error across multiple perturbations.
2
Robustness against multiple adversarial perturbations. Schott et al. [17] demonstrated that `∞
adversarial training is highly susceptible to `0/`2-norm adversarial perturbations and used multiple
VAEs to defend against multiple perturbations on the MNIST dataset. However, it was not scalable
and limited to the MNIST dataset. Tramer et al. [12] investigated the theoretical/empirical trade-offs
between multiple perturbations and introduced adversarial training with worst/average perturbations
to defend against multiple perturbations. However, computing all the perturbations is impractical
for multiple perturbations and large scale datasets. In contrary, our proposed stochastic adversarial
training in Section 4 overcomes this limitation, with improved performance over their method and
has a negligible increase in training cost over standard adversarial training.
3 Robustness against multiple perturbations
Let us consider a classifier fθ : X → Y with parameters θ, inputs X , and labels Y . In this work,
we consider the additive threat model [37] for generating adversarial examples. Specifically, let
x = {x1, . . . , xn}, where xi ∈ X represent the input, then xadv = {x1 + δ1, . . . , xn + δn}
represents the additive threat model where δ = {δ1 . . . δn} is the additive adversarial perturbation
generated by their respective attacks with norm-ball B(x, ε) around x with radius ε.
In this work, we consider the `p norm distance under the additive threat model and adopt the projected-
gradient descent for crafting `p perturbations. In particular, for loss-function L, norm-ball B(x, ε),
and step-size α, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) attack [11] optimizes for the following objective:
xt+1 = proj
B(x,ε)
(xt + α · sgn(OxL(f`(x), y))) (1)
where x0 = x or any randomly-initialized point within B(x, ε), proj is the projection operator
projecting the input onto the norm ball B. Our objective is to attain robustness against δi,∀δi ∈ p(δ)
where p(δ) denotes the perturbations distribution, e.g., the additive perturbations generated by `p
attacks with their respective norm-balls B(x, ε) around x can be represented as {δ1, . . . , δ∞}.
3.1 Adversarial training
In the standard machine learning, the model iteratively optimizes the parameters θ for a network to
generalize to unseen standard test examples. On the other hand, adversarial training [11, 38] is an
empirical optimization technique that optimizes the network using a min-max formulation:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
δ∈B(x,ε)
L (fθ (x+ δ) , y)
]
(2)
The inner maximization generates the adversarial perturbation by maximizing the loss, while the
outer minimization minimizes the loss on the generated adversarial examples. However, adversarial
training is vulnerable to perturbations that are unseen during training [17, 12], which has been referred
to as overfitting on the particular type of training perturbation. Recently, Tramer et al. [12] extended
the adversarial training to multiple perturbations. Their proposed strategies can more formally be
defined as follows:
1. The maximum over all perturbations: The max strategy optimizes the outer objective in Eq. (2)
on the strongest adversarial perturbation from the whole set of n additive adversarial perturbations.
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
[
argmax max
δk1:n∈Bk1:n (x,ε)
L (fθ (x+ δk) , y)
]
(3)
2. The average over all perturbations: The average strategy optimizes the outer objective in Eq. (2)
on the whole set of n additive adversarial perturbations.
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D)
1
n
i=n∑
i=1
[
max
δi∈Bi(x,ε)
Li (fθ (x+ δi) , y)
]
(4)
However, the practicality of these methods is limited, due to an increased computational overhead for
training. Specifically, the average and maximum strategies increase the training time by a factor of
six compared to standard adversarial training, which makes these methods impractical for large-scale
datasets and architectures. To overcome this limitation, we introduce stochastic adversarial training in
the next section, which has comparatively marginal overhead over adversarial training and achieves
state-of-the-art robustness to multiple adversarial perturbations.
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Figure 1: Our classifier is parametrized by θ and the generator is parametrized by φ. Top: Generation:
The generator takes stochastic noise and sampled perturbation Xadv as input to generate the noise-augmented
sample Xaug. Bottom: Meta-training of generator: The meta-noise generator parameters are learned via
meta-learning to minimize the adversarial classification loss after θ(T+1) updates of adversarial classifier model.
4 Learning noise generator for robustness
4.1 Stochastic Adversarial Training (SAT)
To eliminate the computation overhead in the aforementioned strategies, we propose a novel adversar-
ial training strategy against multiple adversarial perturbations. Specifically, we conjecture that it is
essential to cover the threat model during training, not utilizing all the perturbations simultaneously.
In particular, we formulate the threat model as a random perturbation sampled from a distribution of
perturbations p(δ) during each episode (or batch) of training. This prevents overfitting on a particular
perturbation. More formally, the training objective of our proposed stochastic adversarial training can
be defined as follows:
min
θ
E(x,y)∼D
δk∼p(δ)
[
max
δk∈Bk(x,ε)
L (fθ (x+ δk) , y)
]
(5)
Our proposed objective is a drastic simplification of the average one in Eq. (4), which makes it highly
efficient for multiple perturbations. We conjecture that optimizing via SAT promotes generalization
(due to its stochasticity) by preventing over-fitting on a single adversary and helps convergence, as like
mini-batch training for empirical risk minimization helps to generalize neural networks [39, 40, 41].
Our experimental results confirm our hypothesis, demonstrating that it outperforms the baselines with
significantly lower training costs.
4.2 Meta-Noise Generator (MNG)
We now propose a framework with adversarial augmentation and regularization that learns to stochas-
tically perturb adversarial samples for generalization across multiple perturbations. To this objective,
it explicitly learns an input-dependent noise distribution using a noise generator to alleviate the issue
of generalization across multiple adversaries. The parameters of MNG gφ are meta-learned [42, 23]
to measure the efficacy of the generated distribution for robustness. The generator is formulated as a
convolutional network with four 1 × 1 convolutional layers with LeakyReLU activations and one
residual connection from input to output [43].
To train our adversarial classifier jointly with MNG, we alternatively update the parameters θ of
the adversarial classifier with the parameters φ of MNG (see Bottom Figure 1). In particular, we
generate xadv for a mini-batch of size m using Eq. (5) and compute Lcls(θ | xadv, y), where Lcls
is corresponding cross-entropy classification loss. Then, we sample z ∼ N (0, I) for input to our
generator jointly with the sampled adversarial example xadv which generates a noise-augmented
sample xaug (see Top Figure 1). Our final training objective to train our model can be formulated as:
Ltotal(θ | x, y) = min
θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
Lclsi (θ | xadv, y) + Laugi (θ | xaug, y, φ) (6)
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Algorithm 1 Learning to generate noise for robustness against multiple perturbations
Require: D, T inner gradient steps, N training epochs.
input Dataset D, training iterations T , batch size m, distribution of perturbations p(δ)
output Final model paramaters θ
1: for n = {1, . . . , N} do
2: Sample mini-batch of size m, B = {x1, . . . , xm} ⊂ D.
3: Generate the adversarial examples using Eq. (5).
4: Sample z ∼ N (0, I) and generate xaug = xadv + gφ(z, xadv) using MNG.
5: Update θ to minimize Eq. (6).
6: Initialize θ(0) = θ
7: for t = {1, . . . , T} do
8: Update θ(t) using Eq. (8).
9: end for
10: Descent a single step to update θ(T ) to θ(T+1) by Eq. 9.
11: Update the parameters φ of the generator by Eq. (10).
12: end for
Augmentation loss. It has been prominent in the research community that smoother networks lead to
robustness of deep networks [44, 45, 46]. Recently, KL Divergence between pˆ(y | x) and pˆ(y | xadv)
has been incorporated into the adversarial loss [13, 30]. Based on this motivation, we minimize the
Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) among the posterior distributions of pˆ(y | x) and pˆ(y | xadv), and
pˆ(y | xaug). Specifically, our augmentation loss in Eq. (6) can be defined as follows:
Laug(θ | x, y) = min
θ
1
m
m∑
i=1
β · Lclsi (θ | xaug, y, φ) + γ · JSDi(pˆ(y | x); pˆ(y | xadv); pˆ(y | xaug))
(7)
The computation of the optimal φ for the generator requires bi-level optimization. However, bi-level
optimization for adversarial training would be computationally expensive. To tackle this challenge
and reduce the computational complexity of our method, we adopt an online approximation [47, 48]
to update θ and φ using a single-optimization loop. Specifically, given current parameters θ of our
adversarial classifier, we update MNG parameters φ using a 3 stage training scheme:
1. Update model parameters for T steps. First, we update θ to minimize Lcls(θ | xaug, y, φ)
for T steps (we chose T = 2 in our experiments) which ensures the learning of the adversarial
classifier using the knowledge from the noise-augmented sample constructed by MNG. It explicitly
increases the influence of the noise-augmented samples on the classifier in the inner loop. More
specifically, θ(t) moves along the following descent direction on a mini-batch of training data, i.e.,
θ(t+1) = θ(t) − α · 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇θLclsi (θ(t)|xaug, y, φ),
where, xaug = proj
B(x,ε)
(
xadv + gφ(z, x
adv)
) (8)
2. Adapt model parameters on single step. Second, perform one-step update to update θ(T ) to
θ(T+1) to minimize adversarial classification loss from Eq. (5). This step explicitly models the
adaptation of adversarial model parameters in the presence of the noise-augmented data using a
single step of update:
θ(T+1) = θ(T ) − α · 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇θLclsi (θ(T )|xadv, y) (9)
3. Update generator parameters. In the last step, after receiving feedback from the classifier, we
measure the adversarial loss from Eq. (5) and adapt φ to minimize this loss. In particular, φ
performs the following update step to ameliorate the classifier parameters θ in the next step:
φ = φ− α · 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇φLclsi (θ(T+1)|xadv, y) (10)
To summarize, SAT consists of perturbation sampling to generate adversarial examples and MNG
compliments it by stochastically perturbing these samples to improve robustness. Lastly, the adver-
sarial classifier utilizes the generated samples, adversarial samples and clean samples to optimize the
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classification and augmentation loss. We list the detailed algorithm in Algorithm 1. Formally, the
overall objective for a mini-batch of size m and learning rate α can be defined as follows:
min
φ
1
m
m∑
i=1
Lclsi (θ(T+1) | xadv, y)
subject to θ(T+1) = θ(T ) − α · 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇θLclsi (θ(T )|xadv, y),
θ(t+1) = θ(t) − α · 1
m
m∑
i=1
∇θLclsi (θ(t)|xaug, y, φ),
t = 0, . . . T − 1
(11)
Intuition behind our proposed framework. Our proposed SAT algorithm stochastically samples
an attack during each training episode. The induced stochasticity prevents overfitting of adversarial
training on a particular perturbation. Furthermore, MNG stochastically perturbs the sampled adver-
sarial perturbation in a meta-learning framework to explicitly lower the adversarial classification loss
on sampled perturbation. Overall, our proposed framework then optimizes the classification loss
coupled with our augmentation loss which encourages generalization across diverse perturbations.
Furthermore, we empirically illustrate that our proposed framework increases the smoothness of the
model by visualizing its loss surface in the next section, which confirms our hypothesis of our model
preventing overfitting to a single perturbation and leading to smoother models (see Figure 4).
5 Experiments
5.1 Experimental setup
Datasets.
1. CIFAR-10. This dataset [49] contains 60,000 images with 5,000 images for training and 1,000
images for test for each class. Each image is sized 32× 32, we use the pre-activation version of
the ResNet18 architecture [21] as a base network for this dataset.
2. SVHN. This dataset [50] contains 73257 training and 26032 testing images of digits and numbers
in natural scene images containing 10 digit classes. Each image is sized 32 × 32, we use the
ResNet18 architecture similar to the CIFAR-10 dataset as the base network.
Baselines and our model.
1. Nat. Standard convolution neural network.
2. Adversarial Training with `p norm attack (Advp) [11]. Adversarial trained network with `p
norm ball B(x, ε) using PGD attack. We use `∞, `1, and `2 norm-balls for adversarial training.
3. TRADES with `∞ norm attack (TRADES∞) [13]. TRADES adversarial trained network with
`∞ norm ball B(x, ε) using PGD attack.
4. Adversarial Training with robust self-training with `∞ norm (RST∞)[30]. Adversarial train-
ing with robust self-training using `∞ PGD attack.
5. Adversarial Training with maximum/average strategies (Advmax and Advavg) [12]. Adver-
sarial training with the maximum (see Eq. (3)) and average (see Eq. (4)) over all perturbations.
6. Meta Noise Generator with our stochastic adversarial training (MNGSAT). Our proposed
meta noise generator coupled with stochastic adversarial training.
7. Meta Noise Generator with stochastic adversarial training and robust self training
(MNGSAT + RST). Our proposed MNGSAT with robust self training.
Evaluation setup. Following Tramer et al. [12], we perform an exhaustive evaluation of our model on
diverse seen and unseen adversarial attacks [51, 11, 52, 53, 31, 12, 53, 17] with ε = {0.03, 8, 0.31}
for `∞, `1, and `2 attacks respectively. We report the clean accuracy and adversarial accuracy for all
the methods along with the averageRavgadv and the worst adversarial accuracyRmaxadv [12]. We use the
SGD optimizer with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 5 · 10−4 to train all our models with cyclic
learning rate as recommended by Wong et al. [19] for fast convergence of adversarial training. We
use the Foolbox [53] library for all the attacks and all our algorithms are implemented in Pytorch [54].
We list the hyper-parameters in the supplementary material.
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Table 1: Evaluation on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets. For `∞ perturbations, we use FGSM [51], PGD [11],
and Momentum Iterative attack [52]. For `2 perturbations, we use Gaussian-noise [53], boundary [31], and
PGD [11]. For `1 perturbations, we use SLIDE [12], Salt and pepper [53], and Pointwise attack [17]. We
report the average of all the attacks for each `p norm averaged across 3 runs, the best and second-best results
are highlighted in bold and underline respectively. Time denotes the training time in hours. Since training for
RSTavg and RSTmax takes more than 3 days to finish, we do not evaluate them.
CIFAR10 SVHN
Model Acc. `∞ `1 `2 Rmaxadv Ravgadv Time (h) Acc. `∞ `1 `2 Rmaxadv Ravgadv Time (h)
Nat 92.95 2.99 8.33 38.05 0.00 16.46 0.15 96.06 32.42 21.66 68.99 1.89 41.02 1.86
Adv∞ [11] 81.28 49.84 38.72 74.88 16.41 54.48 1.30 89.79 48.99 34.84 80.05 2.42 54.63 1.90
Adv1 89.44 22.43 61.99 75.48 2.53 53.30 3.45 91.90 20.32 64.19 75.41 4.59 51.23 5.05
Adv2 89.15 30.22 44.92 81.68 22.93 51.75 1.35 92.10 23.13 48.39 82.79 13.11 51.44 2.10
TRADES∞ [13] 79.91 51.28 48.44 75.28 22.11 58.33 1.90 91.94 56.89 26.62 79.86 2.23 61.14 2.80
RST∞ [30] 86.39 57.68 46.18 68.76 24.78 57.54 19.6 95.59 64.24 38.25 84.86 4.25 62.45 22.05
Advmax [12] 80.84 48.35 53.43 75.37 39.75 59.05 6.40 88.26 41.29 56.18 79.89 27.66 59.12 8.70
Advavg [12] 83.82 41.74 59.90 77.98 37.46 59.87 5.95 85.81 31.71 58.08 77.80 24.36 55.86 8.90
MNGSAT 79.81 47.12 60.81 75.30 43.90 61.11 2.95 89.00 44.95 65.49 82.12 38.46 65.17 4.13
MNGSAT + RST 86.94 51.96 68.70 79.43 47.89 65.41 33.33 95.06 54.85 73.12 90.69 48.15 75.98 36.88
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Figure 2: Performance of our model compared with the average and max strategy on various `∞, `1, and `2
attacks on adversarial training. Our model outperforms both the methods with significant improvement over all
the considered attacks on SVHN and improves `∞, `1 robustness over Advmax and `1 robustness over Advmax
on the CIFAR-10 dataset with PreAct ResNet-18 architecture.
5.2 Comparison of robustness against multiple perturbations
Results with CIFAR-10 dataset. Table 1 and Figure 2 shows the experimental results against
multiple perturbations for the CIFAR-10 dataset. It is evident from the results that MNGSAT with
RST achieves a reduction of ∼ 20% and ∼ 9% on theRmaxadv andRavgadv metric over the state-of-the-art
methods. We note that, compared to RST∞, it improves theRmaxadv by a factor of two which illustrates
the benefit of our proposed method. Furthermore, MNGSAT outperforms Advavg for all the attacks,
except `2-norm attacks. We believe, this is an artifact of the inherent trade-off across multiple
perturbations [12, 17] (see Figure 3). It is also worth mentioning that MNGSAT achieves ∼ 50%
reduction in training time compared to the multiple perturbations training baselines. Interestingly,
MNGSAT also shows an improvement of ∼ 11% in Rmaxadv over Advmax, which is fundamentally
designed to address the worst perturbation. This demonstrates the effectiveness of MNG in preventing
overfitting over a single perturbation and it’s generalization ability to diverse perturbations.
Results with SVHN dataset. The results for the SVHN dataset are shown in Table 1 and Figure 2.
We make the following observations from the results: (1) Firstly, MNGSAT significantly outperforms
Advmax and Advavg by ∼ 40% and ∼ 58% onRmaxadv and by ∼ 10% and ∼ 17% onRmaxadv metric. (2)
Furthermore, RST increases the performance of our method but also increases the training cost by a
factor of five over the multiple perturbations training. In contrast, our method leads to a significant
reduction of∼ 53% in the training time compared to the baselines trained with multiple perturbations.
(3) Additionally, MNGSAT achieves ∼ 18% reduction in the training time over `1 adversarial training
while achieving comparable performance which illustrates the utility of our method over standard
adversarial training. This implies that our method also leverages the knowledge across multiple
perturbations and improves the performance over single perturbation adversarial training.
5.3 Further analysis of our defense
Effect of augmentation. To investigate how our proposed framework facilitates robustness and
computational efficiency, we investigate the contributions of SAT and MNG. Our analyses comparing
SAT and MNGSAT are summarized in Table 2. First, observe that SAT leads to a ∼ 67% and ∼ 30%
reduction in training time over the baselines and MNGSAT for both the datasets. Interestingly, SAT
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Table 2: Ablation study analyzing the significance of
Stochastic Adversarial Training (SAT) and Meta noise
generator with SAT (MNGSAT). The best results are
highlighted in bold.
Model Acc. `∞ `1 `2 Rmaxadv Ravgadv Time (h)
C
IF
A
R
10 Advmax 80.84 48.35 53.43 75.37 39.75 59.05 6.40
Advavg 83.82 41.74 59.90 77.98 37.46 59.87 5.95
SAT 83.13 41.62 59.88 78.24 37.70 59.86 2.05
MNGSAT 79.81 47.12 60.81 75.30 43.90 61.11 2.95
SV
H
N
Advmax 88.26 41.29 56.18 79.89 27.66 59.12 8.70
Advavg 85.81 31.71 58.08 77.80 24.36 55.86 8.90
SAT 89.90 34.59 60.61 80.65 26.93 58.52 2.95
MNGSAT 89.00 44.95 65.49 82.12 38.46 65.17 4.13
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Figure 3: Ablation study on the impact of Laug on
average robustness of `p norms on CIFAR10. We
observe that with an increase in γ, the robustness
against `∞ and `1 attack increases. However, the
robustness of `2 decreases showing an inherent trade-
off across multiple perturbations.
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Figure 4: Visualization of the loss landscapes for the
`1, `2, and `∞-norm attacks on the SVHN dataset. The
rows represent the attacks and columns represent dif-
ferent defenses. We can observe that ours MNGSAT
obtains smooth loss surface across all `p-norm attacks.
outperforms Advavg on the SVHN dataset for all the metrics and gives a comparable performance
on the CIFAR-10 dataset. To this end, MNGSAT compliments SAT and improves the performance
over all the methods across multiple attacks with significantly lower cost compared to the baselines
trained with multiple perturbations.
Effect of hyperparameters. We further analyze the impact of the hyperparameters: β and γ in our
augmentation loss (see Eq. (7)). We observed that MNGSAT achieved competitive results with β = 1,
however, γ was crucial for its performance. In Figure 3 we analyze the effect of γ, we train MNGSAT
with different values of γ, and evaluate the average performance across all `p norm adversarial attacks.
Our results show that as the value of γ increases the performance on `∞ and `1 attacks improves
significantly. In particular, the performance with `∞ and `1 attack improves by ∼ 8.02% and ∼ 2.3%
respectively. However, an increase in γ leads to a reduction of ∼ 3% in the robustness against the `2
attacks, which is in line with the previous works that have showcased an inherent trade-off between
various attacks theoretically and empirically [12, 17].
Loss surface visualization. We compare the loss surface of various methods against `∞, `1, and `2
norm attack in Figure 4. We can observe that in most of the instances when trained with a single
adversary, the adversary can find a direction orthogonal to that explored during training; for example,
`1 attack results in a non-smooth loss surface for both `∞ and `2 adversarial training. In the contrary,
MNGSAT achieves smoother loss surface across all types of attacks which suggests that the gradients
modeled by our model are closer to the optimum global landscape.
6 Conclusion
We tackled the problem of robustness against multiple adversarial perturbations. Existing defense
methods are tailored to defend against single adversarial perturbation which is an artificial setting to
evaluate in real-life scenarios where the adversary will attack the system in any way possible. To
this end, we proposed a novel Meta-Noise Generator (MNG) that learns to stochastically perturb
adversarial examples by generating output noise across diverse perturbations. Then we train the
model using a loss that accounts for both noise-augmented and adversarial samples. Additionally,
to resolve the problem of computation overhead with conventional adversarial training methods
for multiple perturbations, we introduce a Stochastic Adversarial Training (SAT) which samples
a perturbation from the distribution of perturbations. The experimental validation of our methods
against various benchmark datasets showed that it significantly outperforms the relevant baselines on
a wide variety of perturbations. We believe that our method which allows efficient training as well as
generalization across multiple perturbations will open the door for further research in this direction.
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A Experimental setup
We use the SGD optimizer with momentum 0.9 and weight decay 5 · 10−4 to train all our models
with cyclic learning rate with a maximum learning rate λ that increases linearly from 0 to λ over first
N/2 epochs and then decreases linearly from N/2 to 0 in the remainder epochs, as recommended by
Wong et al. [19] for fast convergence of adversarial training. We train all the models for 30 epochs on
a single machine with one GeForce RTX 2080Ti using PreAct ResNet18 architecture [21]. We use
the maximum learning rate λ = 0.21 for all our experiments. We use β = 1.0 and γ = 16 for all the
experiments with our meta noise generator. We use the Foolbox [53] library for all the attacks and all
our algorithms are implemented in Pytorch [54]. We use the weight for the KL divergence (β = 6.0)
for TRADES and RST in all our experiments.
For attacks, we use a set of diverse gradient-based and decision-based attacks. Specifically, for
`∞ perturbations, we use FGSM [51], PGD [11] and MIM [52]. Note that, FGSM is known to be
a week attack, we employ it to test the robustness of various models when the attacker has less
resources. For `2 perturbations, we use Gaussian-noise [53], boundary [31], and PGD [11]. For
`1 perturbations, we use SLIDE [12], Salt and pepper [53], and Pointwise attack [17]. For all our
experiments and evaluation, we use ε = {0.03, 8, 0.31} and α = {0.004, 1.0, 0.1} for `∞, `1, and
`2 attacks respectively. We use 10 steps of PGD attack for `∞, `2 during training and 50 steps
during evaluation. For `1 adversarial training, we use 20 steps during training and 100 steps during
evaluation.
B More experimental results
Breakdown on multiple perturbations. The results against the CIFAR-10 and SVHN dataset on
PreActResnet-18 architecture against multiple perturbations are summarized in Table 3. We can
observe that our proposed MNGSAT and MNGSAT with robust self-training (RST) outperform all
the baselines onRmaxadv metric andRavgadv metric. Interestingly, on the SVHN dataset, MNGSAT also
outperforms `1 adversarial training on `1 attack with ∼ 18% reduction in training time. In this vein,
we can say that MNGSAT demonstrates the effectiveness of our method as a defense mechanism
against multiple adversarial perturbations.
Visualization of learned noise. To demonstrate the learning ability of our meta-noise generator,
we visualize the learned noise by our generator during training. We present representative samples for
various `p norms and datasets in Figure 5 where each sample is projected to their respected norm-ball
B(x, ε) around x with radius ε. From the figure, we can observe that our meta-noise generator
incorporates the features by different attacks and learns local correlations. In particular, note that
MNG learns diverse input-dependent noise distributions across multiple adversarial perturbations
by explicitly minimizing the adversarial loss across multiple perturbations during meta-training.
Overall, it combines two approaches that are complementary to each other and leads to a novel
input-dependent learner for generalization across diverse attacks.
Visuaization of loss landscape on CIFAR-10. Figure 6 shows the visualization of loss landscape
of various methods against `∞, `1, and `2 norm attack for CIFAR-10 dataset on PreActResnet-18
architecture. We vary the input along a linear space defined by the sign of gradient where x and y-axes
represent the perturbation added in each direction, and the z-axis represents the loss. Similar to the
SVHN dataset, we can observe that the loss is highly curved for multiple perturbations in the vicinity
of the data point x for the adversarial training trained with a single perturbation, which reflects
that the gradient poorly models the global landscape. In contrast, MNGSAT achieves smoother loss
surface across all types of `p norm attacks.
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Table 3: Breakdown of all perturbations on CIFAR-10 and SVHN datasets. For `∞ perturbations, we use
FGSM [51], PGD [11] and Momentum Iterative attack [52]. For `2 perturbations, we use Gaussian-noise [53],
boundary [31], and PGD [11]. For `1 perturbations, we use SLIDE [12], Salt and pepper [53], and Pointwise
attack [17]. We report the average of all the attacks for each `p norm averaged across 3 runs, the best and
second-best results are highlighted in bold and underline respectively. Time denotes the training time in hours.
`∞ `1 `2
Model Acc. FGSM PGD MIM All `∞ SLIDE SAPA PA All `1 PGD GN BA All `2 Rmaxadv Ravgadv Time (h)
C
IF
A
R
-1
0
Nat 92.95 8.96 0.00 0 2.99 0.00 19.00 6.00 8.33 22.34 83.90 7.92 38.05 16.46 92.95 0.15
Adv∞ 81.28 54.02 47.84 47.67 49.84 16.41 54.80 44.97 38.72 75.69 78.33 70.63 74.88 16.41 54.48 1.30
Adv1 89.44 62.21 2.55 2.53 22.43 69.95 66.67 49.27 61.99 76.80 84.93 64.69 75.48 2.53 53.30 3.45
Adv2 89.15 39.34 22.93 28.40 30.22 25.85 63.20 45.70 44.92 82.80 87.33 74.92 82.79 22.93 51.75 1.35
TRADES∞ 79.91 54.7 49.75 49.40 51.28 22.11 76.90 46.30 48.44 74.67 76.90 74.26 75.28 22.11 58.33 1.90
RST∞ 87.08 61.95 54.47 56.62 57.68 24.78 64.42 49.35 46.18 53.32 83.64 69.31 68.76 24.78 57.54 19.6
Advmax 80.84 52.36 46.11 46.57 48.35 39.75 65.40 55.13 53.43 76.52 78.30 71.29 75.37 39.75 59.05 6.40
Advavg 83.82 47.27 37.46 40.50 41.74 49.65 69.80 60.27 59.90 79.06 81.93 72.94 77.98 37.46 59.87 5.95
MNGSAT 79.81 49.03 43.90 45.43 46.12 53.83 68.63 61.60 60.81 75.79 77.17 72.94 75.30 43.90 60.71 2.95
MNGSAT + RST 86.94 56.44 47.89 51.56 51.96 60.92 77.92 67.27 68.70 76.93 86.10 75.25 79.43 47.89 66.68 33.33
SV
H
N
Nat 96.06 53.12 12.29 31.84 32.42 1.89 47.41 15.67 21.66 64.45 93.01 49.50 68.99 1.89 41.02 1.86
Adv∞ 89.79 57.18 42.83 46.97 48.99 2.42 61.18 40.92 34.84 80.55 87.32 72.28 80.05 2.42 54.63 1.90
Adv1 91.90 47.26 9.10 4.59 20.32 44.68 72.59 56.82 57.96 70.43 86.83 68.98 75.41 4.59 51.23 5.05
Adv2 92.10 42.08 13.11 14.20 23.13 32.61 67.56 45.01 48.39 84.17 90.29 73.93 82.79 13.11 51.44 2.10
TRADES∞ 91.94 61.80 54.39 54.49 56.89 2.23 48.50 29.14 26.62 82.34 89.92 67.33 79.86 2.23 58.77 2.80
RST∞ 95.59 73.73 57.62 61.38 64.24 4.25 66.46 44.01 38.25 86.87 93.96 73.76 84.86 4.25 62.45 22.05
Advmax 88.26 50.69 34.70 38.49 41.29 27.66 76.18 64.70 56.18 81.62 86.40 71.65 79.89 27.66 59.12 8.70
Advavg 85.81 42.56 24.36 28.21 31.71 34.14 76.18 63.90 58.08 80.93 86.13 66.34 77.80 24.36 55.86 8.90
MNGSAT 89.00 54.74 38.46 41.12 44.95 44.08 80.37 72.03 65.49 83.50 87.62 75.25 82.12 38.46 65.17 4.13
MNGSAT + RST 95.06 64.10 48.15 52.30 54.85 52.44 88.03 78.89 73.12 91.44 93.51 87.13 90.69 74.94 75.98 36.88
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Figure 5: Visualization of the gen-
erated noise by MNG along with the
perturbed samples on `1, `2, and `∞-
norm attacks for CIFAR-10 and SVHN
dataset.
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Figure 6: Visualization of the loss landscapes for the `1, `2,
and `∞-norm perturbations on the CIFAR-10 dataset. The
rows represent the perturbations and columns represent dif-
ferent defenses. We can observe that ours MNGSAT obtains
smooth loss surface across all `p-norm attacks.
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